I argue that the degree to which candidates focus on a given issue during campaigns is affected by their opponents' emphasis of the same issue. I further argue that this responsiveness should be conditioned by the competitiveness of the election they face. Using television advertising data drawn from 93 U.S. Senate campaigns in 44 states and five election years on 51 issues and a dynamic modeling strategy, I show that candidates increase the attention they devote to issues as their opponents' emphasis of these same issues increases. My results also show that candidates are more responsive to their opponents in competitive elections than in noncompetitive elections. This research is the first to include a dynamic test of issue convergence theory.
Elections are important facets of democratic systems for two key reasons. First, elections allow citizens to hold politicians accountable for their behavior while in office. Second, elections provide citizens with the opportunity to choose between competing visions of the proper role of government on a number of different issues. In order for citizens to select the candidate whose preferences best match their own, citizens must learn about candidates' positions on various issues so that they may make comparisons among the candidates. Such comparisons require candidates to discuss the same issues. Proponents of issue convergence theory argue that discussion of the same issues between competing candidates is common (e.g. Sigelman and Buell 2004; Kaplan, Park, and Ridout 2006; Sides 2006 Sides , 2007 . Other research suggests that candidates should discuss different issues and should not engage in discourse (e.g. Simon 2002; Spiliotes and Vavreck 2002) . In other words, these scholars argue that we should observe issue divergence.
What drives candidates to discuss the same issues during campaigns? I argue that candidates' issue emphases are affected by two factors over the course of their campaigns: the issue emphases of their opponents and the competitiveness of the campaign. Candidates should alter the degree to which they emphasize an issue in part due to their opponent's strategy for a number of reasons. For example, candidates might want to (1) contrast their positions with those of their opponent, (2) respond to their opponents' attacks, (3) signal that they are moderate in an attempt to appeal to the median voter, and (4) avoid criticism from the news media for ignoring an issue. These factors should exert a more powerful influence on candidates' strategies when the election is competitive than when it is noncompetitive because the electoral stakes are higher for candidates.
The extant literature on issue convergence and divergence suffers from an important methodological limitation in that each analysis uses cross-sectional techniques to model dynamic behavior. In other words, these tests cannot show evidence of responsive behavior because of the nature of cross-sectional analyses. I remedy this limitation by treating cam-paign behavior as dynamic in nature and test my theory using data on U.S. Senate television advertisements collected by the Wisconsin Advertising Project for 51 issues discussed in 93 campaigns spread across 44 states in five election years. I use a dynamic modeling technique and find strong support for my theory. I observe issue convergence among Democratic and Republican Senate candidates in both competitive and noncompetitive elections. Candidates running in competitive elections appear to converge at higher rates over the course of their campaigns. In other words, candidates appear to respond to the issue emphases of their opponents by altering their own issue emphases and do so to a greater extent in competitive campaigns than they do in noncompetitive campaigns.
Issues and Campaigns
The preponderance of the extant campaigns and elections literature suggests that campaigns can fundamentally shape election outcomes (e.g. Wlezien and Erikson 2002; Hillygus and Shields 2008; Vavreck 2009 ). Candidates design their campaigns in large part to gain the support of citizens. Candidates may try to do so by using their campaigns to stimulate citizens' underlying predispositions (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954) or to produce a sense of "enlightenment" about the state of the country among citizens (Gelman and King 1993) . In addition, campaigns may act as priming mechanisms (Bartels 2006 , but see Lenz 2009 ) and may alter the degree to which citizens feel uncertain about political candidates (Franklin 1991; Alvarez 1997; Peterson 2004 Peterson , 2009 ). Candidates may also attempt to change citizens' perceptions of the salience of various issues (Carsey 2000) . Finally, coverage of campaigns by the news media can also affect the perceived importance of issues (Kinder 1998a,b; Iyengar and Simon 2000) .
How can candidates gain the support of potential voters during election campaigns?
There are three possibilities. First, candidates may change their positions on issues so that their stated preferences line up with those held by the median voter. This is a straightforward strategy, but it leads to several potential problems. The first is that candidates who choose this route may inadvertently upset their party's activists by trying to appeal to more moderate voters. This is a potentially disastrous strategy because activists tend to hold more extreme views than moderates and may be willing to sit out an election cycle if they do not feel as if their interests are being represented (Wittman 1983; Miller and Jennings 1986; Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993) . A second problem is that many candidates, especially incumbents, have established records that may be difficult to avoid because the news media and candidates' opponents have incentives to point out these kinds of inconsistencies.
Finally, established candidates may find it difficult to alter citizens' views of them because people are motivated reasoners and may respond to information that is incongruent with their prior beliefs by discarding it (Kunda 1990) . Though candidates would like to win the votes of as many of their opponents' supporters as possible, they may find it difficult to do so because these people already hold negative views of them and may therefore ignore messages that suggest they share some common ground with their nonpreffered candidate (but see Hillygus and Shields 2008) .
The second strategy available to candidates is to persuade citizens to change their minds about issues such that citizens' views become aligned with those of candidates. This can be difficult to achieve. Candidates have little incentive to persuade their own supporters and as outlined above, citizens who support candidates' opponents are difficult to persuade because they process information in a biased fashion as a function of their partisan filters. More generally, candidates must first convince citizens that the beliefs they hold are incorrect before candidates can hope to persuade them. This is an especially difficult task faced by candidates who choose to engage in this strategy (Riker 1990 ).
Because of the difficulty inherent in changing their own positions and in changing citizens' minds, candidates may instead engage in a third strategy in which they alter their campaign messages in order to attempt to induce heresthetic change, the process by which candidates alter the considerations citizens use when evaluating candidates (Riker 1990 ).
Because candidates may find it difficult to persuade large numbers of citizens, they may instead attempt to affect the conditions under which citizens make their choices by altering the salience of issues in the election environment. Carsey (2000) argues that candidates focus on the issues that advantage them the most relative to their opponents while avoiding those for which their positions are less advantageous. Candidates, then, should focus their attention on the the issues on which they hold the greatest comparative advantage relative to their opponents. If one candidate is better able than their opponent to implement this strategy, she should be advantaged on election day because citizens should be more likely to think about their choice in a way that favors the successful candidate.
Issue Advantage, Convergence, and Divergence
Most of the extant campaigns literature suggests that candidates should focus on the issues that advantage them. There are several sources of candidate issue advantage. Candidates' personal characteristics and records can affect the degree to which they are advantaged on issues (Sellers 1998; Brasher 2003) . Furthermore, those who hold popular positions on issues also tend to be advantaged relative to their opponents (Damore 2004) . Issue ownership theory represents an additional source of candidate issue advantage. This theory suggests that parties "own" sets of issues and thus are advantaged on these issues because citizens on average think that they are better able to handle problems related to these issues than is the opposing party (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994; Petrocik 1996; Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen 2003) . In the U.S., for example, the Democratic Party is usually viewed as owning issues associated with civil liberties, civil rights, and social welfare while the Republican Party is thought to own issues like national defense, taxes, and civil and social order.
These and other studies (e.g. Budge and Farlie 1983; Carsey 2000) imply that candidates should focus on different sets of issues and should avoid engaging the same issues that their opponents discuss.
1 Some research suggests that candidates should never discuss the same issues as their opponents even during competitive campaigns in which they may face external pressure from the news media to do so (Simon 2002 A second strain of literature leads to a different set of expectations for candidate behavior.
Research on issue convergence suggests that candidates often discuss the same issues as their opponents during campaigns (Sigelman and Buell 2004; Kaplan, Park, and Ridout 2006; Sides 2006 Sides , 2007 . 2 In addition, there is evidence that candidates respond to their opponents based on the latter's (1) degree of attention to party-owned issues in primary (Banda and Carsey 2012 ) and general elections (Banda 2011) , (2) level of attention to gendered issues (Windett 2011) , and (3) number of negative advertisements (Carsey et al. 2011 ). There are several reasons to expect candidates' issue emphases to converge during campaigns. First, extending the logic of (Downs 1957 ) from parties to candidates suggests that candidates should attempt to appeal to members of their opponents' coalitions to reduce their opponents' levels of support and to appeal to the median voter. Hillygus and Shields (2008) , for example,
show that presidential candidates can appeal to cross-pressured partisans by discussing their 1 Petrocik (1996) predicts some dialogue between candidates during campaigns, but he expects this to occur on performance issues such as the state of the national economy. Performance issues are fundamentally different from party-owned issues because issue advantage on the former is temporary while advantage on the latter tends to be stable.
2 There is also some evidence that candidates may make use of both divergence and convergence-based strategies. Spiliotes and Vavreck (2002) , for example, find that candidates from different parties within districts and states diverge from one another while copartisans tend to converge.
positions on wedge issues that they share with these citizens. This strategy may allow candidates to appeal to the median voter and to otherwise unfriendly citizens by generating a more moderate ideological profile through the strategic communication of shared positions (see also Miller and Schofield 2003) . For example, a Republican candidate may spend a lot of time discussing her position on abortion if it is a salient issue during the campaign.
Her position may be popular among most Republicans, but some may hold more liberal preferences that the Democratic candidate can take advantage of by explicating her own more liberal position on abortion.
The second reason to expect to observe convergence in candidate issue emphases is that candidates may feel as if they need to respond when their opponents attack them. Negative campaigns may encourage candidates to talk about the issues that their opponents discuss while attacking them because they may wish to defend their records and positions (Skaperdas and Grofman 1995; Theilmann and Wilhite 1998; Lau and Pomper 2004) . Candidates engage in dialogue when they respond to each other's attacks. This kind of behavior should lead their issue emphases to converge.
The third reason to expect the issue emphases of competing candidates to converge is that candidates may try to reframe issues on which they are disadvantaged in order to portray themselves in a more sympathetic manner (Kinder 1998a; Chong and Druckman 2007) .
Despite the fact that the Republican Party has long owned the issue of crime, Democratic presidential candidate Bill Clinton spent a lot of time discussing it during the 1992 presidential campaign. While Republicans traditionally focused on issues of punishment, Clinton instead focused on the prevention of crime. This kind of strategy could allow candidates to portray themselves more favorably even if they are unable to affect the salience of issues.
Additionally, Jerit (2008) shows that a fourth reason to expect to observe some degree of convergence in candidates' issue emphases is because providing a counterargument may be more persuasive for citizens than reframing an argument or issue. Jerit's research focuses on a political debate that occurred between rather than during an election campaign, but the logic of this argument also fits into a campaigns framework. Candidate A could, for example, discuss their support of additional expenditures on education in terms of leveling the playing field for children in less wealthy areas. Rather than reframing the issue to focus on the costs of the additional spending, Candidate B may be better off arguing that additional expenditures will not improve educational outcomes.
A final reason to expect to observe some degree of issue convergence during campaigns is related to the ambivalence citizens tend to feel towards parties and candidates. Basinger and Lavine (2005) , for example, show that citizens tend to use party cues when deciding which candidate to vote for in low salience elections in large part due to their lack of knowledge about the candidates' positions. Citizens who lack positional information cannot make decisions on the basis of issues and instead rely on partisan heuristics. A very different kind of decision-making process occurs in high salience elections. Partisanship is still important in these kinds of elections, but citizens also choose a candidate on the basis of issues or ideology.
The election environments during salient campaigns tend to be saturated with much more information than in low salience campaigns. The availability of this kind of information is what allows citizens to learn more about the candidates and their positions and thus make decisions on the basis of more than just partisan cues (Franklin 1991; Kahn and Kenney 1999) . Because candidates know that salient elections generate larger volumes of information that citizens consider when choosing which candidate to support, they should not only converge on similar sets of issues, they should also discuss a wider range of issues more generally to provide potential voters with more information about their candidacy (Geer 2006; Franz et al. 2007 ).
Contrary to the expectations laid out by strict proponents of issue ownership and heresthetic change, I argue that candidates should respond to one another's issue priorities by converging on the same issues. In other words, candidates should alter the degree to which they emphasize an issue in response to the level of attention their opponents devote to that same issue. For example, when a Republican candidate increases the amount of time she spends discussing taxes, I expect her Democratic opponent to respond by talking about taxes more. Stated more formally:
The level of attention devoted to an issue by a candidate will increase as her opponent's attention to the same issue increases.
Competition and Campaigns
Some research suggests that candidates' issue emphases will reflect those of their opponents to a greater extent in competitive campaigns than they will in noncompetitive cam- Competitive campaigns also tend to be more negative, in large part because incumbents will attack rather than ignore their challengers (Kahn and Kenney 2004) . Candidates who are attacked may feel as if they need to defend their record. They could do so by discussing the same issue in an attempt to "set the record straight" or they could attack their opponents on the same issue in an attempt to decrease their opponents' advantage on that issue.
Competition is key here because front-running candidates have little incentive to respond to their challengers unless they feel electorally threatened.
In addition, the news media should be more interested in competitive campaigns for two reasons. First, competitive campaigns generally produce more information that can be framed into interesting and easy to follow narratives about important political conflicts. These kinds of narratives can then be explicated to citizens who should be more interested in consuming these kinds of stories than those that are produced by noncompetitive elections in which there is little to no drama or import. Second, journalists may not view noncompetitive elections as being very newsworthy and thus may be less willing to devote scarce resources to covering these kinds of campaigns. Candidates should be aware of the conditional behavior of the news media and may feel greater pressure to respond to their opponents when they face the additional coverage brought about by competitive campaigns.
I argue that candidates should be more responsive to their opponents in competitive campaigns than in noncompetitive campaigns. Candidates' issue emphases, then, should converge more in competitive elections than in noncompetitive elections. This conditional relationship is summed up in the following hypothesis:
The level of attention devoted to an issue by a candidate will increase as her opponent's attention to the same issue increases to a greater extent in competitive elections than in noncompetitive elections. Table 1 .
Research Design
[ Table 2 .
[ 
Measurement and Modeling
I collapsed these advertising data by year, state, issue, and week to create time series.
Each observation represents the percentage of candidate i's advertisements that mentioned issue j in that week. These weekly percentages of attention to issues serve as both my dependent variable and one of my key independent variables, as the attention one candidate devotes to an issue should affect the level of attention given to that same issue by that candidate's opponent.
I use the Cook Political Report's race ratings as my indicator of electoral competition.
In its raw form, the ratings are a seven point measure for which competitiveness is strongest in the middle categories. Its seven values are "solid Democratic," "likely Democratic," "lean Democratic," "toss up," "lean Republican," "likely Republican," and "solid Republican." I collapsed this scale down to a simple dichotomous indicator of competition; contests coded as "leaning" or "toss up" were coded as being competitive (1) while the rest were coded as noncompetitive races (0). About 59% of the contests in my data were competitive.
I included dummy variables in my model indicating whether or not a campaign occurred in a given year to control for differences brought about by the year in which the contest took place. I also included dummy variables coded one if the issue was owned by the Democratic or Republican Party and zero if it was not to account for the proclivity of candidates to focus greater attention on their own party's issues. I report the summary statistics for these variables in Table 3. [ Table 3 about here.] I use pooled time-series-cross-sectional data in order to capture campaign dynamics. My theory predicts interaction between candidates and the behavior I want to model occurs simultaneously, so I must control for possible simultaneous and unmodeled correlation in the behavior of the candidates. I do so using seemingly unrelated regression, which allows for multiple equations and for the error terms of each equation to be contemporaneously correlated with one another (see Carsey et al. 2011 for a similar application).
I employ an error correction modeling framework, which allows me to calculate the long and short run effects of my time serial covariates on my dependent variables (DeBoef and Keele 2008) . The dependent variable of an error correction model is the first difference of a temporal variable rather than its value at time t. This framework also requires the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable and both first differences and lagged levels of the remaining time serial covariates.
I estimate two equations simultaneously, one for Democratic candidates and the other for their Republican opponents. The equations follow:
In these equations, D and R stand respectively for Democratic and Republican Senate candidates' issue emphases. "D ijt ," for example, refers to Democratic candidate i 's emphasis of issue j in week t. The coefficients generated for the differenced covariates represent the average short term -i.e. contemporaneous -change in the dependent variable that results from a one unit increase in the covariate. This contemporaneous effect occurs at time t. The coefficients of the lagged covariates correspond to a second short term effect, this time at time t + 1. These effects at time t + 1 are not theoretically interesting on their own, but when they are divided by the absolute value of the coefficient generated for the lagged dependent variable, they generate the long run multiplier (LRM), which represents the average total change in the dependent variable over future time periods given a one unit increase of the associated covariate.
5 I will therefore focus on the coefficients of the differenced covariates and the long run multipliers when interpreting the effects of the issue emphasis of a candidate's opponent on the candidate's own issue emphasis. 
Expectations
I expect candidates to alter their issue emphases in response to those of their opponents.
If a candidate devotes additional attention to an issue, I expect that candidate's opponent to respond by increasing her own attention to that same issue. Furthermore, I expect these effects to be larger in competitive environments relative to noncompetitive environments.
In other words, I expect that coefficients generated for the endogenous variables and their associated long run multipliers will be positive and significantly (p ≤ .05) different than zero. Should these expectations be met, these results would offer support for convergence theory rather than heresthetic change or issue ownership theories of issue emphasis. I also expect the estimated coefficients of the lagged dependent variables to be be negative and significantly (p ≤ .05) different from zero because causation in the model should be dynamic rather than static (see DeBoef and Keele 2008).
Results
Before moving on to my statistical results, I first present some of my data graphically. I plot Democratic and Republican Senate candidates' emphasis of taxes during four campaigns in Figure 1 . The general pattern suggests that candidates respond to their opponents' emphasis of taxes by altering their own attention to the issue. As my statistical results below show, the same is true across issues.
[ Figure 1 about here.] Table 4 contains the results of my seemingly unrelated regression. 6 The first column contains the results for Democratic candidates while the second contains those for their
Republican opponents. The table also contains the correlation of the residuals generated by each equation; at -0.05, this relationship is negligible.
[ Table 4 about here.]
The error correction modeling framework allows researchers to perform a test of Granger causality by performing a block F-test on the differenced and lagged coefficients generated for endogenous covariates. If the test suggests that coefficients are not jointly equal to zero, then I can say that the endogenous variable Granger causes the dependent variable. I performed block F-tests for each of the equations presented in Table 4 . I included (1) the differenced and lagged coefficients generated for the issue emphases that matched the sponsor's, (2) the differenced and lagged coefficients generated for the issue emphases interacted with my measure of competition, and (3) the competition indicator. 7 These tests produce χ 2 values 6 I report a fairly parsimonious model here, but I also ran several different specifications. I ran models including indicators for whether or not the sponsoring candidate was an incumbent and whether or not the race was for an open seat. I also included fixed effects dummy variables for states and issues in additional models. None of these specifications, jointly or independently, altered the substance of the results I present. Figure 2 shows the effects of a one standard deviation increase in a candidate's opponent's issue emphasis on the candidate's own emphasis of the issue for both Democratic and
Republican candidates in competitive and noncompetitive elections. 8 The estimated contemporaneous and over time effects plotted in Figure 2 reaffirm the the effects I described above. I observe issue convergence in candidates' advertising strategies and this tendency towards convergence tends to be stronger in competitive elections than in noncompetitive elections.
[ Figure 2 about here.]
Conclusion
The results of my analysis suggest that candidates respond to their opponents strategically over the course of campaigns and that this response takes the form of issue convergence.
I also find that the degree to which candidates respond to one another is conditioned by competition; in more competitive environments, candidates converge at higher rates. In other words, candidates respond to one another's issue priorities by increasing the level of atten-tion they devote to the issues their opponents spend more time discussing. The evidence presented in this research favors convergence theory.
The results of this research lead to two related implications. First, it appears that substantive debate in U.S. campaigns may not be as weak as critics in the news media believe it to be. Candidates often address the same issues as one another and appear to do so in direct response to their opponents. Issue convergence may be useful for citizens because when candidates discuss the same issues, citizens can learn about candidates' competing views. This issue convergence may allow citizens to assess candidates on the same issues when they otherwise might be forced to do so on the basis of different issues. The knowledge stemming from this convergence-based discourse should allow citizens to more easily identify the "correct" candidate to support.
Second, if competitive environments encourage more issue convergence, it stands to reason that more competitive elections breed a healthier democratic system. Richer information environments should allow citizens to draw more comparisons between candidates across a range of issues than should the lower levels of information brought about by noncompetitive election environments. The kinds of information environments fostered by competitive campaigns should also improve citizens' abilities and proclivities to make decisions.
Future research might explore why Republican candidates appear to converge at lower levels than their Democratic opponents. The differences I observe may, for example, be explained in part by institutional factors at the state-level or in the Republican Party. Learning about the logic underlying these decisions would improve our understanding of the strategic behavior of candidates generally and about dialogue in U.S. campaigns specifically. Note: cell entries are estimated coefficients generated using ordinary least squares regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Both equations were estimated using seemingly unrelated regression. * = p ≤ .05 Figure 2: The contemporaneous and over time effects of opponents' issue emphasis. Note that these are predicted effects generated by a one standard deviation increase in a candidate's opponent's attention to an issue.
